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1Uncertainty, Futures Markets and Basis Risk
1 Introduction
1.1 Production decision under uncertainty and hedging: a survey
"Theory of the Competitive Firm under price Uncertainty" is in the common sense due to
Sandmo (1971). Even if his principal result had always been highlighted by Baron (1970)
and Rotschild and Stiglitz (1970), we have Sandmo to thank for his more complete and clear
presentation. His principle result describes consequences of output price uncertainty on the
behavior of a risk-averse expected utility maximizer ¯rm. Compared to either deterministic or
risk-neutrality cases, risk aversion leads to diminish output quantity. The main contribution
of Sandmo was to establish the relationship between production theory and the recent Arrow-
Pratt notion of risk aversion.
These results were discussed in the 1970s. Mainly, Batra and Ullah (1974) viewed the input
side and Ishii (1977) completed the Sandmo's paper by envisaging a change in risk aversion of
the agent. None of these models allude to derivatives markets and hedging possibilities. This
gap was ¯lled by Holthausen (1979) and Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980). Their main result, the
separation property is prominent in the ¯nancial literature. Roughly speaking, this property
states that when a forward market is available for a risk-averse agent, this agent will consider
the current forward price exactly as a certain future spot price and then equalize his marginal
production cost to this price. Its production decision become in that case independent of its
subjective price distribution and moreover of its attitude towards risk1. The forward price is
then the benchmark variable for ¯rm's production.
The main following contributions are summarized in table (1). This table shows mainly that
separation property applies when a forward market is available. Note that separation property
fails when a independent unhedgeable background risk is introduced. It also fails when basis
risk is taken into account.
1.2 Motivation of the paper
The aim here is to focus on the input price risk in an expected utility framework. As mentioned
in the table, just two contributions took this point into account. First, Paroush and Wolf (1992)
consider a deterministic two-factors production function and just one of the two inputs is viewed
as risky. A futures market2 exists for this input and basis risk is envisaged. Both production
function and output price are deterministic. No simple result is derived from this analysis,
but in°uences from multiple factors, as basis risk magnitude, sign of crossed-derivatives and
market situation (contango or normal backwardation)3 are studied.
Viaene and Zilcha (1998) consider a ¯rm exposed to both input and output price uncertain-
ties4. A futures market is available for the output but not for the input. Authors conclude to
1Note that this separation property is a bit similar to the Tobin's one (1958)in the case of portfolio choice
with one risk-free asset.
2An exhaustive presentation of derivatives can be found in "Futures, Options and Derivatives", Hull, 2003.
3(contango or normal backwardation concepts can also be found in Hull (2003) or in Simon and Lautier
(2003).
4Risk and uncertainty refer to the same notion here and the di®erence between those two concepts in the
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Authors Approach Hypothesis Conclusions
Holthausen (1979) EU Output price Separation
Forward Markets % risk ) % hedge
Bench = forward
Feder-Just EU Output price Separation
Schmitz (1980) Bench = forward
Paroush-Wolf (1986) EU Output price Forward CS Separation
Forward et Futures Bench = forward
Antonovitz EU Output price Forward CS Separation
Nelson (1988) Forward et Futures Bench = forward
Safra-Zilcha (1986) Mon. Pref Output Price Separation
Forward Markets
Paroush-Wolf (1992) EU Input Price (1/2) Separation fails
Futures for Basis Risk
Briys-Crouhy EU Output Price NB: N¤ < N ¤ ¤ < Q
Schlesinger (1993) Background risk CONT : Q < N ¤ ¤ < N¤
Wong (1996) EU Output Price & Q if Kimball (93)
Background risk & Q if DARA Ross(81)
Separation fails
Adam-MÄ uller (1997) EU Income Separation fails
Exchange rate
Forward rate
Viaene-Zilcha (1998) EU Input Price Separation fails
No hedging
Table 1: Hedging and Uncertainty Literature
failure of separation property in the general case. Note that this approach is very close to the
background risk approach.
The case where the ¯rm has the possibility to manage its risk both on input and output side
is remarkable and has not been studied yet. Liberalization has decreased the singularity of this
situation. Lots of competitive markets and following derivatives products emerged due to the
Knight'sense (1921) are ignored.
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deregulation. In the energy sector, for instance, lots of ¯rms are now exposed to uncertainty
before and after their production process. For an electricity producer, gas price is risky as
well as electricity price is, and futures markets exist in both cases5. We can also think to an
oil re¯nery (crude oil into gasoline or heating oil) or a aluminium producer (aluminium and
electricity price risks).
The paper is organized as follows: second section considers the case of forward markets in
the multi-risks framework, third one envisages two inputs and focuses on the demand variations
due to the uncertainty. Section four to conclude.
2 Production and hedging decisions without basis risk
2.1 The model
The model is a two-periods model (t = 0;1). Consider a ¯rm producing a unique good y
bought in the second period at a price ~ p 6 in the second period. In the ¯rst period (ex ante)
the price ~ p is unknown by the ¯rm. The output quantity is F(x) with F a concave production
function7 with a single input x. F is a deterministic production function8 or in other words
quantity is perfectly known when x is chosen. In the same way, input price ~ c is unknown (ex
ante) and is introduced linearly in the pro¯t function (unit cost). Random aspect of ~ p and ~ c
are formalized as follows:
~ p = ¹ p + °² ; ~ c = ¹ c + ±´
where ¹ p and ¹ c are respective means and ° and ± are respective standard-deviations. ² and
´ are zero-mean and unit-variance noises. Moreover noises are assumed to be statistically
independent that is to say E(²´) = 0.
Assume now that two futures markets are available, the ¯rst for y and the second for x.
Futures prices in the ¯rst period for these two goods are respectively given by p0 et c0 and
assume, in a ¯rst step, that basis risk is absent. Futures prices and spot prices in second period
will then be equal, or:
~ fp = ~ p et ~ fc = ~ c
Let g and h be quantities bought - or sold - on futures markets respectively for y and x,
pro¯t function of the ¯rm can then be written:
~ ¦ = ~ p:F(x) ¡ ~ c:x ¡ g(~ p ¡ p0) + h(~ c ¡ c0) (1)
5Concerning electricity, remember that markets are simply emerging markets(see EIA Report "Derivatives
and Risk Management in the Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Electricity Industries", October 2002).
6Tilde always mention random variables.
7Marginal productivity will be noted F1 and its ¯rst derivative F11, thus F1 > 0 and F11 < 0.
8Stochastic production function is generally assumed in the agricultural world.
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In the same way as Holthausen (1979) and all models presented in the survey section, all
control variables have to be chosen in the ¯rst period and because of the two-periods model, no
time-inconsistency problem can arise. To summarize, in the ¯rst period the ¯rm has to choose
its output, and then its input demand, and its two hedge levels. All decisions are taken in an
uncertainty framework because of both input and output price risks. In the second period the
all output is sold at the competitive price.
Remark 1 We implicitly assume a instantaneous production process in order to avoid price
change possibilities during production, and consequently a third period to the model. Thus we
do not take into account the time resolution of uncertainty problem described for instance by
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (2004)9.
All decisions are taken for the ¯rm by an individual decision-maker with a classical Von-
Neumann Morgenstern utility function u(:). Remember VNM properties: [E(u(:))]0 > 0 and
[E(u(:))]00 < 0 following identical properties for the original utility function u(:). Decision-








Due to the concavity of the utility function and neoclassical production function's properties,

























u0(~ ¦):[~ c ¡ c0]
¤
= 0 (5)
Or by integrating expressions retained for ~ p and ~ c :































9"Optimal consumption and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty", forthcoming European Economic
Review.
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2.2 Solutions and Analysis
2.2.1 Production Decision
Because of the marginal utility strict positivity, equation (9) con¯rms the well-known separa-
tion theorem.
Proposition 1 (Separation) Decision production is independent of its subjective distribution
about input and output price risks. This decision is also independent of ¯rm's attitude towards
risk.
Proof is straightforward because F1(x):p0 ¡ c0 is a non-stochastic term. This property had
never been envisaged for the input and output price risks case. The model con¯rm the intuition
that when perfect derivatives markets are available, production decision and hedge decision
are separable. For the ¯rm the interest is on decisions' timing. Once forward price is known,
production capacity can be chosen without taking into account spot price evolution. Flexibility
in production is not necessary due to the all-adjustment made in derivatives markets10.
2.2.2 Hedging decision
Jointly to production decision, adjustment in derivatives markets for risk-aversion motive is
achieved. On each market - input or output - decision depends on market situation. Results
are summarized in the table (2). We can see that full-hedging paradigm is a very particular
case, corresponding to the unbiasedness in both markets. In all other situations, there is either
under or overhedge. Note that these results consider the two risks respectively on input and
output price as independent.
2.3 Imperfections on forward markets
We consider imperfections on forward markets by looking the extreme case of market absence.
Consider ¯rst that no e±cient derivatives market exists for output. After evaluation, we show
as Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980), the positive e®ect of forward markets on production. For
a neoclassical (concave) production function, the ¯rm choose a lower output because of its
risk-aversion. By a lower output, we mean that a concrete di®erence exists between an agent
who know the future spot price and an agent with an expected spot price equal to the certainty
10For more about production °exibility, see "Forward Markets and the Behavior of the Competitive Firm
with Production Flexibility", Bulletin of Economic Research, Wong(2003).
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output Normal Backwardation Unbiased Contango
input
g < F(x);h > x g = F(x);h > x g > F(x);h > x
Normal Backwardation Under output Full output Double overhedge
Over input Over input
g < F(x);h = x g = F(x);h = x g > F(x);h = x
Unbiased Under output Double full hedge Over output
Full input Full input
g < F(x);h < x g = F(x);h < x g > F(x);h < x
Contango Double underhedge Full output Over output
Under input Under input
Table 2: Input and Output Hedging Positions
future spot price of the ¯rst agent. Note that this case is particularly close to Sandmo (1971)
because of the total risk elimination on input risk due to input forward market availability.
In the reverse case, where an e±cient derivatives market on output is available only, result
is symmetrical, and decision production is lower too in the decreasing returns to scale case.
The e®ect of introduction of a forward market is positive on production decision again11 even
if in particular case this issue has been discussed (multiplicity of exchange places for instance).
3 Risk premium in the multi-input case
3.1 The model
We now consider a ¯rm with a unique output at a non-stochastic price p. The output F(x1;x2)
is made with two substitutable inputs with prices ~ p1 and ~ p2. Prices are not known ex ante. A
futures market exists for each input. Futures prices are f0
1 , f0
2 and ~ f1 , ~ f2 respectively in the
¯rst and the second period. If we call g and h quantities respectively bought for x1 and x2,
pro¯t can be written as follows:
~ ¦(x1;x2;g;h) = pF(x1;x2) ¡ ~ p1x1 ¡ ~ p2x2 ¡ g(f0
1 ¡ ~ f1) ¡ h(f0
2 ¡ ~ f2) (10)





=@x1 ´ v1 = E
£







=@g ´ v2 = E
£




11Note that with forward markets production decision under uncertainty is also independent from ¯xed costs
(Cayatte, 2004).
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As in the last sections, spot and futures prices are randomized by an additive noise. For
the multiplicative case, see Adam-MÄ uller (2002), Mahul(2002) Alghalith (2003) and Alghalith
and Dalal (2003). Thus we have :
~ p1 = ¹ p1 + Ã® ; ~ f1 = ~ p1 + ¯' = ¹ p1 + Ã® + ¯'
~ p2 = ¹ p2 + °² ; ~ f2 = ~ p2 + ±´ = ¹ p2 + °² + ±´
With E(®) = E(') = E(²) = E(´) = 0 and E(®2) = E('2) = E(²2) = E(´2) = 0.
Statistical independence between all noises are given by :
E(®') = E(²') = E(´²) = E(®´) = E(®²) = E(´') = 0
F1 and F2 are the ¯rst derivatives respectively on the ¯rst and the second input, then FOC
can be now written :














































If we assume, at the ¯rst time, that basis risk is zero on both futures markets, or Ã =
± = 0. By adding the two ¯rst FOC and the two seconds, we show that input demands (and
then output level) are independent from attitude towards risk and from anticipations on price
distribution.
Proposition 2 With two or more stochastic-price inputs, and without basis risk, the separa-
tion property holds.
Proof 1 No basis risk means : Ã = ± = 0. By adding (15) and (16) we have : pF1 ¡ ¹ p1 =
¹ p1 ¡ f0
1. Symmetrically : pF2 ¡ ¹ p2 = ¹ p2 ¡ f0
2 or pF1 = f0
1 et pF2 = f0
2 ¤
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Consider now a non degenerated and non zero basis risk for both futures markets. In order
to simplify the FOC and to introduce the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coe±cient, we can write
the expected pro¯t as :
¹ ¦(x1;x2;g;h) = pF(x1;x2) ¡ ¹ p1x1 ¡ ¹ p2x2 ¡ g(f0
1 ¡ ¹ f1) ¡ h(f0
2 ¡ ¹ f2) (19)
Consider now that basis risks on the two markets are di®erent from zero, or Ã 6= 0 and
± 6= 0. In order to simplify the FOC and integrate the Arrow-Pratt coe±cient, we use the
expected pro¯t expression:
¹ ¦(x1;x2;g;h) = pF(x1;x2) ¡ ¹ p1x1 ¡ ¹ p2x2 ¡ g(f0
1 ¡ ¹ f1) ¡ h(f0
2 ¡ ¹ f2) (20)
We can then measure di®erence between pro¯t and expected pro¯t:
~ ¦ ¡ ¹ ¦ = (Ã® + ¯')g ¡ Ã®x1 + (°² + ±´)h ¡ °²x2 (21)
A ¯rst order Taylor's expansion from u0 around ¹ ¦ gives:
u0(~ ¦) ¼ u0(¹ ¦) + (~ ¦ ¡ ¹ ¦)u00(¹ ¦) (22)
Remark 2 A ¯rst order Taylor's expansion implicitly assume a CARA utility function with
normality distributions for input prices, or further a quadratic utility function. This approach
highlight limits of the mean-variance approach (for a survey see Wagener (2001), "Comparative
statics under certainty: the case of mean-variance preferences", discussion paper, University
od Siegen). Note that Paroush and Wolf's papers (1989,1992), and consequently this paper,
suggest also an implicit mean-variance approach due to the only ¯rst order Taylor's expansion
(see Alghalith(2001))12.




























, and using last approximations :
v1 ¼ pF1 ¡ ¹ p1 ¡ Ã2r(x1 ¡ g) (23)
12Another relevant paper is Tsiang (1972) for the relationship between mean-variance preferences and nor-
mality.
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v2 ¼ ¹ p1 ¡ f0
1 + Ã2r(x1 ¡ g) ¡ ¯2rg (24)
v3 ¼ pF2 ¡ ¹ p2 ¡ °2r(x2 ¡ h) (25)
v4 ¼ ¹ p2 ¡ f0
2 + °2r(x2 ¡ h) ¡ ±2rh (26)
with r the Arrow-Pratt coe±cient evaluated in ¹ ¦.
(23) to (26) equations allow to describe ¯rm's behavior for production and hedging. None
the less, these conditions are just approximations, and thus prudence concept, measurable
by third derivative is neglected13. Consequences of prudence behavior will not be taken into
account in this paper.
3.2 Solutions
3.2.1 Input demand and production
Equations (23) to (26) allows to calculate ratio between marginal productivity for each input.
In the homogeneous ¯rst degree function case, this ratio can be expressed as an increasing
function of the two inputs ratio itself14, or F2
F1 = T(x1=x2). Consequently, we can by reciprocity










Proposition 3 In the ¹ ¦ neighborhood, an increase in x1 basis risk leads to a fall in the x2
demand, compared to x1 demand. The more [less] is the basis risk for x2, the much more
[less] is the fall. Similarly, a decrease in x1 basis risk leads to an increase in the x1 demand,
compared to x2 demand. The more [less] is the basis risk for x2, the much more [less] is the
increase. Symmetric properties follow for x2.
This last result allows to highlight the risk premium concept in the theory of the compet-
itive ¯rm under price uncertainty. When the ¯rm is confronted to a choice between two (or
more) inputs, its risk-aversion behavior leads to prioritize the most certain input (statistically
speaking). When the idiosyncratic risk of the input can be hedged by a futures market, the
basis risk subsists. The ¯rm is henceforth induced to favour the input with the least basis risk
(last unhedgeable risk).
13The original article is due to Kimball(1990), who extend precautionary saving highlighted by Leland(1968),
Sandmo(1970) and Drµ eze and Modigliani(1972) in the consumption framework. For a global presentation see
Gollier(2001).
14This is also the case for an homothetic function. Note that this is a realistic case for energy activity for
instance.
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As Sandmo (1971) and others, we show here consequences of the risk aversion in the pro-
duction decision domain. Following Paroush and Wolf (1992) our interest is here on input price
uncertainty. We show that risk-averse agent is ready to concede a part of his expected pro¯t
by reducing his demand for too risky input. In a expected pro¯t approach, these decisions
can appear non-optimal, but as in portfolio theory or insurance theory, they satisfy risk-averse
behavior.
NB pour x1
11 0 pF p −=
0
110 pF f −=
0
110 pF f −=
02
11 0 pF f rg β −− =
02
11 0 pF f rg β −− =
22 0 pF p −= 0
22 0 pF f −=
0
22 0 pF f −=
02
22 0 pF f rh δ −− =
02






Figure 1: Input demands with basis risk - The substitutable factors case
Proposition 4 (Semi-separation) Production decision is independent of the subjective in-
put prices distributions. However, production decision is dependent of agent's attitude towards
risk and subjective futures prices distributions. We can then conclude to semi-separation.
This proposition explains how, to a large extent, price risk is eclipsed by basis risk. This is
a crucial result for risk management for two reasons. First, it allows to be focused just on one
risk, instead of two. Secondly, informed agents generally have a better skill on the basis risk
management. Further more, basis risk variability is often below the physical or futures market
variability level, as mentioned by Haushalter (2000)15.
3.2.2 Hedging Decision
Equations (24) and (26) are symmetrical. They allow to establish optimal hedging level for
each input. A simple transformation gives the hedge ratio, or the proportion of the physical
15G.D.Haushalter "Finance Policy, basis risk, and Corporate hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers",
Journal of Finance, 55(1).
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position which tends to be hedged:
x1 ¡ g =
f0







x2 ¡ h =
f0







Proposition 5 If noises on all markets are independent, optimal hedge for each input is de-
termined separately.
Corollary 1 (Paroush-Wolf, 1992) When a basis risk is added, a over-hedge could be pre-
ferred in normal backwardation.
These two results follow from equations (28) and (29). If the proposition is straightforward,
the corollary can be elicited. We can remark that if basis risk is su±ciently low, even if f0
i <
¹ pi
16, then we could indeed encounter a over-hedge situation. Remember that paradoxically,
this situation is generally associated with the contango case. This property is close to the
Paroush and Wolf's result (1992)17.
4 Concluding remarks
We tried, in this paper, to have a look at the input price risk. Very often neglected because of
the prominence of the output price in the pro¯t, the input price question is now particularly
relevant in the deregulation framework. Uncertainty spread through the all economic process
and uncertainty sources are now multiple. Concerning input price uncertainty, we have here
generalized several results generally associated with the output price risk. So what are the
possible extensions?
In a ¯rst approach, input price problem seems isomorphic to the output price problem.
Further results need to con¯rm this point, and perhaps a discussion about production function
characteristics are conceivable.
Moreover, in the two-risks case when futures markets are available, a relationship is often
existing between the two price evolutions. Nobody would sustain that gas and electricity
prices evolve independently and lots of econometric studies con¯rm this assertion (see for
instance "Relationship between Electricity and Natural Gas Futures Prices", Journal of Futures
Markets, Emery-Liu (2002)).
16A normal backwardation situation.
17Note that Paroush and Wolf's result is not robust when basis risk tends to zero. In this case and in a
contango framework, a under-hedge decision is optimal. This last result is of course an abberation if we refer
to the hedging theory. An possible explanation would be perhaps limits due to the only ¯rst degree Taylor's
development.
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Finally, it would be relevant also to explicit analytically the risk premium mentioned in the
last section in the general case, we mean without any restrictions on production function. It
could allow to measure exactly the way to favour one input instead of an other because of risk
considerations.
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